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Abstract 
Does partisan alignment affect sub-national political units’ performance? When testing for a partisan 
alignment effect local authority planning processes represent a ‘hard case’, given procedural 
insulation against politicisation, and a disjuncture between national party commitments to expand 
house-building versus pressure on local councillors from residents opposing new developments. I 
find that, in general, partisan alignment brings an increased propensity to approve large residential 
planning applications. This suggests councillors’ willingness to ‘take one for the team’ by prioritising 
national over local interests. Consistent with ‘party politics of housing’ insights, inter-party variation 
sees an altered effect in left-wing constellations, which display lowered approval propensities. In 
addition to these substantive extensions to scholarship on partisan alignment effects, the insights 
presented into the drivers of variation in local authority planning outcomes contribute to the 
pressing tasks of understanding and addressing the chronic under-supply of new housing within the 
English housing system.    
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Partisan alignment effects have been widely studied in relation to inter-governmental resource 
transfers. From this literature, we know that central government often seeks to reward sub-national 
units controlled by the same party, and to target resources towards electoral districts with narrower 
majorities (e.g. Dixit and Londregan 1998, John and Ward 2001, León-Alfonso 2007, Solé-Ollé and 
Sorribas-Navarro 2008, Migueis 2013, Bracco et al 2015, Kleider et al 2018). In contrast, the effect of 
partisan alignment on policy performance is yet to attract significant attention. Given the 
importance of sub-national levels of governance in delivering key services and shaping policy 
outcomes (e.g. Sellers and Lidström 2007, Baker and Eckerberg 2008, Potoski 2008, Batley and 
Stoker 2016), it is of pressing importance that this oversight be addressed. In addition, the issue of 
inter-party variation in partisan alignment effects remains under-explored.  
 Through this paper, I specifically explore variation in English local authority propensity to 
approve large residential planning applications. Local authority planning decisions are formally 
insulated from political pressures. As such, planning outcomes represent a hard case with which to 
test for a partisan alignment effect.1 Tensions between national- and local-level party preferences 
present an additional potential inhibitor of a partisan alignment effect, with national-level advocacy 
for increased house-building coming up against local-level opposition to new developments. Given 
this context, the confirmation of a partisan alignment effect in this area is surprising. Overall, this 
finding suggests that the influence of intra-party discipline and local politicians’ desire for career 
advancement may be shaping planning outcomes.  
                                                             
1 There are some suggestions that, notwithstanding this formal insulation from political factors, planning 
process can and do become politicised. Existing academic literature on local authority planning outcomes 
raises the possibility of political factors shaping outcomes, while also noting that we have an under-developed 
understanding of these processes. CCHPR (2014: 33), for example, notes that many developers believe that 
local political issues shape outcomes of large residential planning applications. There are in addition cases 
where guidance provided by local authorities to councillors with responsibility for planning acknowledges that 
political factors are likely to inform decision-making processes (e.g. Maidstone Local Planning Authority 2007: 
7). 
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My analysis covers observed planning application outcomes from 2009 to 2018. This time 
period saw Westminster governments under Labour, a Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition, and 
the Conservatives, and we see that the partisan alignment effect shifts with changes to the party in 
power. The overall partisan alignment effect is significant and positive across the whole cohort. 
However, we see a significant difference amongst left-wing constellations, where alignment in fact 
brings a reduced propensity to approve large residential planning applications. Previously, inter-
party variation in partisan alignment effects has remained under-studied. The finding is coherent 
with scholarship on the ‘party politics of housing’, which suggests that left-wing parties stand to 
make national-level electoral losses from expansions of owner-occupation (an outcome that follows 
from higher levels of housebuilding, given that the preponderance of new build is used for owner-
occupation). In this case, national left-wing governments’ fear of lost electoral support may be over-
riding their proffered policy commitments to expanded house-building. This finding of inter-party 
variation in a partisan alignment effect represents a notable extension of the literature. 
By focusing on housing and planning in England, I address the gap in existing literature on 
partisan alignment and policy outcomes through an important case study. It is widely acknowledged 
that the English housing system suffers from chronic under-supply of new housing (Wilson and 
Barton 2018). Resultant upward pressure on house prices and housing costs are recognised as 
contributing to the emergence of an inter-generational crisis; ‘Generation Rent’ is less able than 
previous cohorts to access owner-occupation, and will face increased housing vulnerability through 
their middle- and older-ages (Best and Martin 2019). By highlighting political economic drivers of 
variation in local authority propensity to approve large residential planning applications,2 I shed 
significant new light on the foundations of these dysfunctions and tensions. I also more broadly 
contribute to debates over the nature of central-local government relations within British politics, 
                                                             
2 In line with Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government definitions, a large residential planning 
application is defined as one that proposes the construction of ten-or-more new units. See MHCLG official 
website, available at https://data.gov.uk/dataset/b4fed81d-ab70-4540-91a1-7f16068b6d99/planning-
applications-decisions-major-and-minor-developments-england-district-by-outcome. Accessed 24th July, 2019. 
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presenting evidence of sub-national autonomy within a literature that more typically offers a vision 
of a highly centralised state. While local authority decisions on large residential planning applications 
take place within an overarching national policy framework, there is significant variation in 
outcomes. 
 I develop my analysis of the drivers of variation in local authority propensity to approve large 
residential planning applications through the following structure. In the first section below, I situate 
the contributions made to scholarship on partisan alignment. Substantive contributions are made 
through my focus on policy outcomes in an area that typically privileges the study of fiscal transfers, 
and through my exploration of inter-party variation in the nature of the partisan alignment effect. In 
the second section, I lay the foundations for the empirical analysis by outlining the hypotheses 
regarding the expected partisan alignment effect on planning outcomes, and introducing control 
variables for the model drawn from a broad range of Political Science and Political Economy 
scholarship. In addition, through this second section I provide information on the variety of forms 
taken by planning processes across English local authorities. I then in the third section provide an 
explanation of data sources and methods used, before in the fourth section presenting and 
discussing the results. The concluding section of the paper offers a recap on the core insights 
developed, and reflects on the relevance of these findings. Overall, I suggest that the evidence of 
politicised decision-making uncovered through this analysis of local authority planning outcomes 
warrants enhanced monitoring of outcomes delivered through this governance system. I also 
suggest that, given the existence of a partisan alignment effect in this formally insulated area of local 
government that features a disjuncture between central and local party preferences, it is important 
that other aspects of sub-national politics be probed for parallel evidence of politicisation.  
 
Extending scholarship on partisan alignment: Policy outcomes and inter-party variations 
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Partisan alignment denotes a context in which two or more levels of a political system are under the 
formal control of the same political party (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008: 2317). Within the 
field of party politics, the impact of partisan alignment on inter-governmental resource transfers has 
attracted significant attention. After first reviewing key contributions to this field, in the paragraphs 
below I outline the extensions I offer. In short, whereas existing scholarship privileges the study of 
partisan alignment effects in relation to financial transfers, I expand the focus of this field by 
demonstrating the existence of a partisan alignment effect in relation to a policy outcome. I also 
demonstrate inter-party variation in manifestations of the partisan alignment effect, in a field where 
inter-party variation remains under-explored. 
 In the main, studies of partisan alignment effects have focused on the relationship between 
party control and intra-governmental financial transfers. Historically, studies of intra-government 
transfers tended to create models of allocatively efficient distributions. The goal from such work was 
to answer the research question: ‘What distributive choices should governments make to ensure 
that their scare financial resources generate optimal productivity gains?’ (e.g. Oates 1972, Dahlby 
and Wilson 1994). One extension to this strand of scholarship came through attempts to add-in a 
consideration of governments’ political goals, thereby re-orienting the overarching research 
question toward: ‘What distributive choices should governments make to ensure that their re-
election prospects are optimised?’ Focusing on this amended question, the contribution from 
Lindbeck and Wiebull (1987) suggests, for example, that governments should target resources 
toward ‘marginal voters’; individuals who do not have a strong attachment to a given party, and 
therefore are in danger of not support the government’s party unless given an inducement to do so.  
 A broad range of scholarship has followed in the wake of this attention on the politics of 
fiscal distributional outcomes. Grossman (1994) and Levitt and Snyder (1995) find, in their studies of 
federal government grant distribution to state- and local-level governments in the US, that 
alignment is positively associated with the volume of financial transfers. Worthington and Dollerby 
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(1998) and Migueis (2013) confirm broadly similar dynamics in Australia and Portugal respectively. 
John and Ward (2001), when analysing transfers from central to local government in the UK through 
the 1980s and into the 1990s, confirm the existence of a partisan alignment effect in the UK. While 
debate remains over the factors that shape observed variation, it is now accepted that partisan 
alignment effects significantly shape intra-governmental fiscal transfers.3  
Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008), in their study of transfers within Spain, provide a 
relatively uncommon example of a study that includes a period of time where partisan control has 
shifted in the upper level of government. Through their application of the differences-in-difference 
research design, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro are able to robustly demonstrate the existence of a 
sizeable partisan alignment effect on fiscal transfers, although cross-party variation in the partisan 
alignment effect is not probed. By deploying a panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) data 
estimator, I here am able to probe the interaction between party control and partisan alignment 
effect.  
It is readily acknowledged that, in contemporary politics, policy outcomes are contingent on 
interactions across multiple layers of governance (e.g. Majone 1994, Marsh et al 2003, Levi-Faur 
2005, Sellers and Lidström 2007, Baker and Eckerberg 2008, Potoski 2008, Dubash and Morgan 2012, 
Batley and Stoker 2016). It is, as such, surprising that the effect of partisan alignment on policy 
outcomes remains so under-studied. Rigby’s (2012) study of state-level implementation of the US 
federal government’s Affordable Care Act 2010 provides a partial exception, demonstrating as it 
does that Democrat-controlled states were significantly more likely to implement required 
legislation and reform to support the implementation of the Federal-level Democratic government’s 
policy.4 Also in relation to the US, we have seen that partisan alignment between governing party 
                                                             
3 See, for example, findings from Dixit and Londregan 1998, León-Alfonso 2007, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 
2008, Migueis 2013, Bracco et al 2015, Kleider et al 2018). 
4 It should be noted that the focus in Rigby (2012) is on partisan influence (i.e. the effect of state-level party 
control on outcomes) rather than partisan alignment per se. Indeed, methodologically, the lack of variation in 
upper-level government control means that it would not be possible to isolate partisan influence from a 
partisan alignment effect in this study (Ollé-Sollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008: 2303) identify the limitations 
In press with British Journal of Politics and International Relations  
Accepted December 2020 
7 
 
and elected justices significantly influence outcomes of cases involving government agencies 
(Thrower 2017), and that partisan alignment between governing party and the head of a governing 
agency may shape the degree of delegated authority granted to that agency (Palus and Yackee 
2016). This scholarship suggests that partisan alignment may influence policy outcomes. My 
contribution through this paper is to demonstrate this influence, and to do so in relation to a difficult 
case and in a manner that establishes the existence of inter-party variation in the nature of the 
partisan alignment effect. 
 
Planning outcomes in England: The expected partisan alignment effect 
Within this paper, I seek to explain variation in the outcomes of planning applications submitted to 
local authorities for permission to build large residential developments.5 Within England, planning 
applications are governed through a process that brings together frameworks and processes under 
the control of the Westminster government and frameworks and processes under the control of 
local authorities. Formally there is insulation at the local-level to guard against planning decisions 
being shaped by political considerations, although there is broad agreement that this insulation 
remains imperfect. While local authorities’ preferences may diverge from those of the Westminster 
government, there are nonetheless intra-party dynamics that could be expected to incubate a 
partisan alignment effect. In the paragraphs below, I provide an overview of Westminster and local 
authority roles in planning decisions, and of the intra-party dynamics that may incubate a partisan 
alignment effect. 
                                                             
from lack of variation in upper-level government control in their review of earlier literature on partisan 
alignment effects). 
5 In line with Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government definitions, a large residential planning 
application is defined as one that proposes the construction of ten-or-more new units. See MHCLG official 
website, available at https://data.gov.uk/dataset/b4fed81d-ab70-4540-91a1-7f16068b6d99/planning-
applications-decisions-major-and-minor-developments-england-district-by-outcome. Accessed 24th July, 2019. 
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The planning system regulates the use of and modification to land and buildings, and 
constitutes an important lever of state power. At the national level, the Ministry of Housing, 
Communities, and Local Government (MHCLG) oversees the National Planning Policy Framework 
(NPPF). The NPPF sets the general principles and guidelines that local authority planning decisions 
must adhere to. Where a party is dissatisfied by the outcome of a planning application, they may 
embark upon an appeal process that runs from the local authority up to the Ministerial level. 
Ultimately, an appeal can result in judicial review, under which a High Court judge has the power to 
quash, prevent, or require a local authority decision, or to clarify a legal point of order.  
In addition to these pathways for appeals, the Planning Inspectorate (an executive agent of 
MHCLG) monitors local authority planning outcomes against a range of performance indicators. The 
Inspectorate can take action should an authority, for example, lose too high a proportion of appeals 
that have been brought against them, the underlying logic being that such a pattern demonstrates 
that the authority has an elevated tendency to inappropriately reject planning applications.6 Across 
England, each year local authorities take decisions on around 8,000 large residential planning 
applications, rejecting around 1,500.7 Around 50 percent of the rejected applications are appealed 
against, and typically around 40 percent of these appeals are upheld.8  
At the Westminster level, governments have for some decades displayed a frustration with 
what has been perceived as an overly-restrictive planning process and articulated a desire to see the 
system support increases to rates of house-building across the country. Indeed, there is broad 
consensus that the sustained under-supply of new housing within England and attendant pressure on 
housing costs and decreasing rates of owner-occupation constitutes a ‘housing crisis’ (Wilson and 
                                                             
6 For overviews of these frameworks and processes, see for example Claydon (1998) and Upton (2019). 
7 See Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government live data table 120A, ‘Planning authorities – 
residential planning applications, England’. MHCLG official website, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-planning-application-statistics. Accessed 
5th April, 2019. 
8 See Planning Inspectorate live data table 2.5, ‘Dwellings – major and minor appeals decided’. Planning 
Inspectorate official website, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/planning-inspectorate-
statistics. Accessed 5th April, 2019. 
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Barton 2018). Reflecting this concern, central governments under all parties have, since the 1980s, 
delivered commitments to expand national housing supply through election manifestos and targets 
within relevant planning policy frameworks (Adams 2011, Wilson 2019).9  
There is a ‘party politics of housing’ literature that is of relevance to Westminster 
governments’ housing preferences. In particular, Ansell (2014) and Adler and Ansell (2020) show that 
expanding home ownership is associated with rising national-level support for right-wing policies; 
owner-occupiers have a ‘self-insurance’ asset that reduces their support for social insurance 
programmes, and given the falling real cost of their mortgage payments over time they have higher 
lifecycle income that reduces their support for redistribution. As such, while rhetorical commitment 
to expanded rates of housebuilding may be common to both left- and right-wing parties at the 
Westminster level, the former may fear an erosion of their electoral support from expanded owner-
occupancy, while the latter may welcome an expansion to their base from such an outcome. While 
national data on the proportion of new-build housing that become owner-occupied is not collected, a 
large preponderance is used for owner-occupancy.10 Following on from these party politics of housing 
insights, the higher the rate of house-building, the higher the likely electoral gains that are accrued by 
right-wing parties. 
                                                             
9 Since the 1980s, central government ministers have consistently pushed for overall levels of housing supply 
to be higher than rates proposed by local authorities (Adams 2011: 953). Manifesto commitments to expand 
the rate of house building have featured prominently from this time, as have central government 
commitments to quantitative targets for delivering additional housing units. In the mid-2000s the Labour 
government announced an aim of overseeing the supply of 240,000 houses per year by the mid-2010s, while 
the 2015 Conservative government’s agenda was framed around a drive to supply an additional 1,000,000 
homes in the five years to 2020 (Wilson 2019: 3). 
10 Shortcomings in UK data collection in relation to housing are well-established (see, for example, Clegg and 
Farstad 2019: 12). MHCLG data differentiates between ‘private enterprise’ (131,770 units in 2018), ‘housing 
association’ (27,210), and ‘local authority’ (2,000) new-build completions.  However, it does not differentiate 
between housing intended for owner occupancy or rental modes. The proportion of private enterprise heading 
toward rental has historically been very low, and while it has risen significantly in recent years is likely to still 
only account for around 20 percent of such output. In addition, over recent years, an increasingly significant 
proportion of housing association output has been sold to owner-occupancy. Therefore, while precise figures 
are not available, it is likely that in the earlier years covered by this study, when almost all private enterprise 
went to owner-occupancy, around 80 percent of all new-build housing went to owner-occupancy. In later 
years, when up to 20 percent of private enterprise construction has moved to build for rent, the proportion of 
total new-builds heading toward owner-occupancy still remained above 65 percent. For background on these 
dynamics, see Clegg (2020) and  Savills (2020). 
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 At the sub-national level, local authorities play the key role in the planning process. The 
structure of local government in England is complex, with some areas using a two-tiered and others a 
one-tiered structure. Within this variegated structure, primary control of decisions over planning 
applications rest with District Councils, Unitary Authorities, Meteropolitan Districts, and London 
Boroughs.11 Most authorities operate under a ‘cabinet’ model, with significant decision-making power 
residing with a small number of executive councillors from the party in control of the majority of seats 
in an authority (or from a governing coalition). However, decisions on planning applications are 
required to be governed by Planning Committees; bodies composed by elected councillors, and whose 
membership is aligned with the political make-up of the authority as a whole (Coulson and Whiteman 
2012: 186, LGA 2013: 9). Formally, Planning Committees are designed to function as technocratic 
rather than political structures, with councillors sitting on the committee being required to put party-
political considerations to one side and to make the decision as to whether to accept or reject a 
planning officer recommendation in accordance with materially-relevant factors (Clayton 1998, LGA 
2013: 30, Weston and Weston 2013: 186-90). In practice, however, it is widely acknowledged that 
Planning Committees can become politicised arenas.  
 Whereas in many other national systems developers’ rights are more fully codified, in the 
English model local authority planning committees enjoy relatively high degrees of discretion (Davies 
et al 1989, Booth 1996, Coehlo et al 2017). A range of studies demonstrate that local activism can 
sway local authority planning committee outcomes (e.g. Toke 2005, Van der Horst 2007, Toke and Van 
der Horst 2010), suggesting the existence notable levels of agency on the part of planning committees. 
Indeed, it is commonly thought that political considerations influence outcomes (Flemming and Short 
1984: 965, Ball et al 2008: 5, CCHPR 2014: 33). In this regard, Ball (2010: 12), describes planning 
committees as arenas in which ‘local planning principles and politics plays out’.12 Given the space for 
                                                             
11 For an accessible overview see ‘Local Government Structure, politics.co.uk website, available at 
https://www.politics.co.uk/reference/local-government-structure. Accessed 23rd June, 2020.  
12 Emphasis added. 
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politicisation at the local level, attention needs to be presented to the incentive structures presented 
to local councillors.  
On the one hand, at the local level, it is known that local councillors face significant push-back 
against new developments from constituents wishing to preserve the existing natural and built 
environment (Upreti and van der Horst 2004, Sturzaker 2011). Counter-balancing this local-level 
pressure to reject large residential planning applications, intra-party dynamics may (under partisan 
alignment) push councillors toward increased approval rates. As noted above, Westminster parties 
have displayed a consistent support for increased rates of house-building in the UK (with the caveat 
that, in line with insights into the party politics of housing, such support may well be stronger from 
national-level right-wing parties). We know that councillors are likely to be heavily engaged in the local 
branch of their national party prior to standing as a councillor (Rallings et al 2010). As such, councillors 
will likely be familiar with their party’s stated national-level goals and priorities, and may be keen to 
support these priorities when the party is in power nationally. A desire to follow the established career 
trajectory of councillor-to-Member of Parliament, a trajectory documented by Allen (2014), may 
further enhance councillors’ willingness to ‘take one for the team’ by prioritising national above local 
party goals.13   
Taking the above into consideration, the following hypotheses can be generated in relation to 
partisan alignment effects on propensity to approve large residential planning applications: 
H1: Where there is partisan alignment between the national and local levels, a local authority’s 
propensity to approve large residential planning applications will be increased. 
H2: Left-wing partisan alignments will generate lower increases to a local authority’s 
propensity to approve large residential planning applications. 
                                                             
13 Allen (2013) also provides insight into the gendered dimensions of the councillor-to-MP pathway, highlight 
the lower rates with which female councillors move from local to national positions. 
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The intuition underpinning H1 is that all councillors, regardless of party membership, will be subjected 
to some intra-party pressure to prioritise national policy objectives. The intuition underpinning H2 is 
that, in line with insights into the party politics of housing, such pressure will be lower within left-wing 
parties that stand to reap additional electoral payoffs from the overall increase in rates of owner-
occupancy that follow from the completion of new-build developments. Beyond these central 
hypotheses, I turn to broader literature within Politics and Political Economy to identify additional 
factors that should be controlled for within the empirical analysis.  
The first factor I identify as a control variable relates to sub-optimal market outcomes. 
Literature associated with the public interest theory of the state shows that governments are likely 
to try to correct outcomes they perceive to be imperfect or undesirable, stimulating market actors in 
response to situations of under-supply (Stigler and Friedland 1962, Stigler 1971, Baron and Myerson 
1982, Baumol 2004). This body of scholarship often adopts an expansive conceptualisation of sub-
optimal market performance, typically encompassing scenarios in which governments believe that 
overall welfare can be enhanced through intervention (Hantke-Domas 2003: 166). In line with these 
insights, it is likely that councillors or housing officers may respond to evidence of sub-optimal 
outcomes from under-supply by becoming increasingly permissive toward applications for planning 
permission. 
 The second factor I identify to control for relates to the proximity of elections. An expansive 
literature on political cycles has grown since Norhaus’ (1975) initial exploration of the interaction 
between elections and political cycles. Studies have shown that politicians seek to appease their 
electorate in the run-up to an election by delivering enhanced spending levels (Schuknecht 2000, 
Brender and Drazen 2005), with Blais and Nadeau (1992) and Viega and Viega (2007) demonstrating 
this dynamic specifically in relation to sub-national units. As noted above, we know that planning 
applications have the potential to generate significant and highly-visible local opposition (Dear 1992, 
Pendall 1999, Bell et al 2005, Michaud et al 2008). As such, it is possible that councillors will become 
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more adverse to approving planning applications in the run-up to a local election. It is also possible 
that, in the run-up to a national election, national parties may put enhanced pressure on aligned 
authorities to ramp-up approval rates in support of national policy commitments to expand housing. 
 The third control factor that I identify relates to geography, specifically to the location of a 
local authority on a rural-to-urban scale. Systematic differences in planning processes are likely to 
exist between rural, predominantly urban, and urban settings. National-level guidelines in the UK 
differentiate between types of activities that are typically permissible in rural and non-rural settings, 
and allow for some higher restrictions to be applied to new developments in rural areas (MHCLG 
2019: 17).14 We also know that, in general, planning processes in predominantly urban settings can 
be tilted towards strategies of ‘containment’ that aim to limit the further expansion of urban 
concentration (Gallent et al 2006: 457). 
 The fourth control factor that I identify is party control of a local authority. Goodchild (2010) 
suggests that, at the local level, right-wing councillors are likely to face greater pressure to block large 
residential planning applications. Such councillors’ supporters are likely to be both more politically 
engaged and to be home-owners, and therefore may be expected to provide stronger pressure to 
reject applications that may disrupt the local environment and lower house prices (by increasing 
supply). Additional insights into these dynamics are provided by Coelho et al (2017), Johnston et al 
(2001: 200), and Berry and White (2014: 3)  
 Through the next section of the paper, I review my operationalisation of variables used to 
test for H1 and H2, and to control for the additional factors noted above. 
 
Data and methodology 
                                                             
14 Specifically, under the National Planning Policy Framework, local authorities have greater powers to compel 
that affordable housing be included in new developments in rural relative to other settings (MHCLG 2019: 17).  
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For the dependent variable, I use Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government 
(MHCLG) data on local authority planning outcomes. Data is available on the number of large 
residential planning applications received and the number of approvals granted from 2008/09 
through to 2017/18.15 This timeframe sets the overall parameters for the study.16 The propensity to 
approve figure captures the percentage of applications received that were approved, such that a 
value of 100 denotes that all applications were approved.17   
To capture partisan alignment, I combined data on local authority control from The Elections 
Centre with corresponding data on Westminster party control to create a dummy variable.18 Overall, 
for 2008/09-2009/10 (i.e. during the Westminster Labour government), a value of one is given 
where a local authority was under Labour control and a value of zero to all other cases. For 2010/11-
2014/15 (i.e. during the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Westminster government), a value 
of one was given where a local authority was under Conservative or Liberal Democrat control and a 
value of zero to all other cases. For 2015/16-2017/18 (i.e. during the Conservative Westminster 
government), a value of one was given where a local authority was under Conservative control, and 
a value of zero to all other cases. I have operationalised party alignment as a contemporaneous 
independent variable. This reflects an assumption that through a given year, local councillors will be 
taking planning decisions taking account of their current (non-)alignment with the national 
                                                             
15 Variable timeframes run in twelve-month cycles that begin and end mid-year. Local authority data planning 
and housing data runs in an April-to-March cycle, while electoral and political control data derives from the 
(non-) occurrence of an election and from party positions within a May-to-April cycle. The minor discrepancy in 
timeframes is unavoidable.  
16 See MHCLG Historical Live Data Tables, available from the MHCLG official website at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-planning-application-statistics. Accessed 
24th July, 2019.  
17 The 2009-18 timeframe captures several changes of national government, and so allows partisan alignment 
effects to be isolated from partisan orientation effects within the regression model. This relatively long 
timeframe includes the introduction of the National Planning Policy Framework, which was intended to 
increase local authorities’ propensity to approve development applications. As is detailed below, to check the 
robustness of the regression model, I have run a version that includes a dummy variable to control for the 
influence of the NPPF. 
18 The Elections Centre reports the party in overall control of an authority (i.e. holding more than half of the 
available seats. For parsimony, cases with no overall control were removed from the dataset. See The Elections 
Centre Councils Composition Dataset, available from The Elections Centre official website at 
http://www.electionscentre.co.uk/?page_id=3802. Accessed 24th July, 2019. 
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government. In 2008/09 and 2009/10, the Labour Westminster government may have been pushing 
Labour local authorities to boost approvals, the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Westminster 
government pushing Conservative and Lib Dem local authorities through 2010/11-2014/15, and the 
Conservative Westminster government pushing Conservative local authorities through 2015/16-
2017/18. 
The Aligned Westminster election dummy variable captures cases in which a local authority 
was in alignment with central government in the year of a Westminster election. The intuition here 
is that councillors may be placed under enhanced pressure to support national party aims in the run-
up to a national election. Labour controlled authorities were coded as positive for the 2009/10 
observation year, to capture the potential influence from the incumbent Westminster Labour 
government in the 12 months leading up to the mid-2010 national election. Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat authorities were coded as positive for the 2014/15 observation year to capture the effect 
from the Coalition incumbency through the 12 months to the mid-2015 election. Conservative 
authorities were coded as positive for the 2016/17 observation, on account of the mid-2017 
election. This variable is modelled as having a contemporaneous impact on approval propensity, to 
capture the likelihood that, in the twelve months leading up to a Westminster election, central 
governments may be ramping up pressure on aligned councillors to support national objectives by 
adopting a more permissive planning attitude through this time. 
Data relating to the occurrence of a local election was derived from the Ministry of Housing, 
Communities, and Local Government Election Timetable. The Election Timetable provides 
information on the year in which elections are held in local authorities, and the proportion of seats 
up for re-election.19 There is significant variation in the format of elections across types of local 
authorities; local authorities either hold one election every four years at which all seats are 
                                                             
19 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/election-timetable-in-england. Accessed 9th 
April, 2019. 
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contested, one election every two years at which half of all seats are contested, or three elections at 
which one-third of seats are contested over a four-year cycle. Using this data, I created a dummy 
variable to capture years when local elections took place. Where, for example, an election occurred 
in a given local authority in May 2009, a positive value is assigned to that case for the 2008/09 
observation. I have operationalised the election occurrence measure as a contemporaneous 
variable. The assumption here is that councillors may adjust their behaviour in the 12-month period 
leading up to an election. 
Data on party control was derived from The Elections Centre reporting on local authority 
party control. To incorporate this factor into the model, I created a dummy variable for Labour 
control and a dummy variable for Liberal Democrat control. The variable is modelled as being 
contemporaneous with the outcome variable, under the intuition that party control in a given year 
effects approval propensity in that year. 
 I use two indicators to capture market sub-optimality arising from housing under-supply. 
From the Office for National Statistics (ONS), I use data on house price unaffordability.20 The ONS 
unaffordability figure is a ratio of the mean annual income to the mean house price in a given area.21 
The higher the figure, the less affordable the local housing and the greater the market failure. A 
value of five for this variable, for example, captures a situation in which the average house price was 
five times the average annual income. I take this measure to capture housing need as experienced 
by relatively affluent populations, given that unaffordability is a problem experienced by relatively 
affluent individuals who are on the margins of home ownership and wish to access this mode of 
housing. From MHCLG, I use data on local authority housing waiting lists to capture unmet demand 
                                                             
20 The ONS use the term ‘affordability’. To clearly communicate the fact that a larger figure presents evidence 
of greater market failure, I here prefer the term ‘unaffordability’. 
21 See ONS House Price to Earnings dataset, Table 5c Ratio of Median House Price to Median Gross Annual 
Residence-based Earnings by Local Authority, available from ONS official website at 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/housing/datasets/ratioofhousepricetoresidencebas
edearningslowerquartileandmedian. Accessed 24th July, 2019. 
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for affordable rental housing,22 a source that captures housing need as experienced by less affluent 
populations. To account for variation in local authority population, this waiting list figure is 
expressed as a proportion of the total local authority population.23 The intuition is that local 
councillors may respond to evidence local housing market failures (as evidenced by unaffordability 
of house prices and large housing waiting lists) by moving to boost supply through an increased 
permissiveness toward residential planning applications.24 I operationalise these market failure-
related variables with a one-year time lag, on the assumption that councillors are likely to be acting 
on the basis of data from the previous year. 
The UK government geographic typology of local authorities was used to incorporate a focus 
on rural-urban differences into the model. Specifically, the Department for Food, Rural Affairs, and 
Agriculture rural-urban classification (2009) was used as the basis of a fixed-effect variable. The 
classification labels local authorities as ‘predominantly rural’, ‘significantly rural’, and ‘predominantly 
urban’. To operationalise, I have recoded 1-3 rural-urban.25  
 
Results and discussion 
Table 1 shows that the average propensity to approve large residential planning applications across 
the 2009-18 period was 78.50, with a range running from 16.67 through to 100. Tables 2-4 show 
interesting variation across Labour, Liberal Democrat, and Conservative authorities, with respective 
                                                             
22 MHCLG Table 600 Numbers of Households on Local Authorities' Housing Waiting Lists by District, available 
from MHCLG official website at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-rents-
lettings-and-tenancies. Accessed 24th July, 2019. 
23 See ONS projects of local authority populations, available from the ONS official website at 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationprojections/dat
asets/localauthoritiesinenglandtable2. Accessed 30th June, 2020. 
24 Given (as noted above) that the preponderance of planning applications are used to generate new-build for 
owner occupancy, one may expect a stronger relationship between local unaffordability and approval rates as 
against local waiting lists and approval rates.  
25 See Rural-Urban Classification for a Range of Geographies, available from Department for Food, Rural 
Affairs, and Agriculture official website at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/2001-rural-urban-
definition-la-classification-and-other-geographies. Accessed 25th June, 2020. 
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approval propensities of 86.12, 75.80, and 75.74. Housing in Labour authorities is on average more 
affordable (with an income-to-price ratio of 6.70 compared to Liberal Democrat (7.92) and 
Conservative (7.73) authorities), and housing waiting lists are on average longer (3.33 percent of the 
population compared to Liberal Democrat (2.81 percent) and Conservative (2.30) authorities. Across 
all cases there are 1,251 cases of partisan alignment, of which 52 are Labour, 52 are Lib Dem, and 
1,147 are Conservative.26  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (all observations) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Freq 
Approval propensity 2,750 78.50 16.62 16.67 100 ~ 
Partisan alignment 2,750 0.45 0.50 0 1 1,251 
Aligned Westminster election 2,750 0.07 0.26 0 1 200 
Local election 2,750 0.39 0.49 0 1 1,080 
Housing unaffordability 2,750 7.47 2.52 2.95 30.49 ~ 
Housing waiting list 2,750 2.60 1.78 0 17.96 ~ 
Rural-urban27 2,750 2.23 0.88 1 3 ~ 
Labour local authority 2,750 0.27 0.44 0 1 732 
Libdem local authority 2,750 0.05 0.22 0 1 138 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (Labour authorities) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Freq 
Approval propensity 732 86.12 13.31 22.22 100 ~ 
Housing unaffordability 732 6.70 2.91 2.95 19.44 ~ 
Housing waiting list 732 3.33 2.19 0 17.64 ~ 
Rural-urban28 732 2.84 0.48 1 3 ~ 
Partisan alignment 732 0.07 0.26 0 1 52 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (Lib Dem authorities) 
                                                             
26 The inter-party disparity reflects the low number of years with a Labour Westminster government, low 
number of Lib Dem controlled authorities, and the widespread Conservative control of local authorities 
combined with Conservative presence in the Coalition government followed by single-party government.  
27 818 cases were classified as predominantly rural, 469 as predominantly urban, and 1463 as urban. 
28 35 cases were classified as predominantly rural, 45 as predominantly urban, and 652 as urban. 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Freq 
Approval propensity 138 75.80 18.23 25.00 100 ~ 
Housing unaffordability 138 7.92 2.01 3.61 15.68 ~ 
Housing waiting list 138 2.81 1.87 0.19 17.18 ~ 
Rural-urban29 138 2.51 0.79 1 3 ~ 
Partisan alignment 138 0.38 0.49 0 1 52 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics (Conservative authorities) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Freq 
Approval propensity 1,880 75.74 16.75 16.67 100 ~ 
Housing unaffordability 1,880 7.73 2.32 3.54 30.49 ~ 
Housing waiting list 1,880 2.30 1.48 0.00 17.96 ~ 
Rural-urban30 1,880 1.98 0.88 1 3 ~ 
Partisan alignment 1,880 0.61 0.49 0 1 1147 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics (aligned authorities) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Freq 
Approval propensity 1,251 77.07 15.70 16.67 100 ~ 
Housing unaffordability 1,251 7.99 2.45 3.01 30.49 ~ 
Housing waiting list 1,251 2.14 1.35 0.00 10.68 ~ 
Rural-urban31 1,251 1.92 0.89 1 3 ~ 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics (non-aligned authorities) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Freq 
Approval propensity 1,499 79.70 17.27 20.00 100 ~ 
Housing unaffordability 1,499 7.04 2.50 2.95 22.01 ~ 
Housing waiting list 1,499 2.97 1.99 0.00 17.96 ~ 
Rural-urban32 1,499 2.50 0.78 1 3 ~ 
 
To explore the observed variation in local authority propensities to approve large residential 
planning applications, I ran an OLS PCSE model. The OLS PCSE model is appropriate for analysing 
                                                             
29 26 cases were classified as predominantly rural, 16 as predominantly urban, and 96 as urban. 
30 757 cases were classified as predominantly rural, 408 as predominantly urban, and 715 as urban. 
31 547 cases were classified as predominantly rural, 262 as predominantly urban, and 442 as urban. 
32 271 cases were classified as predominantly rural, 207 as predominantly urban, and 1,021 as urban. 
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time series cross sectional data in which temporally and spatially correlated errors and 
heteroscedasticity may be present. Indeed, Beck and Katz (1995) demonstrate that the OLS PCSE 
model is superior to the alternative Generalised Least Squares estimator, which can generate 
extreme overconfidence in the significance of dependent variable effects. In addition to the 
variables noted in the section above, I included interactions between party control and partisan 
alignment in the model. Table 7 provides an overview of results, and Figure 1 provides a marginal 
effects graph.  
 






Partisan alignment 4.276 (0.886)*** 
Aligned Westminster election -0.543 (1.221) 
Local election 1.328 0.604* 
Housing unaffordability 1.255 0.184*** 
Housing waiting list 0.178 0.186 
Rural-urban 1.371 0.494** 
Labour local authority 9.852 0.953*** 
Libdem local authority -0.908 2.152 
Labour-Partisan alignment  -11.944 2.162*** 
Libdem-Partisan alignment  2.097 3.539 
N 2,750  
X2 .093***  
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
Figure 1: Marginal effects graph (average marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals) 
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Overall, the model is significant (p<0.001), and explains around 9 percent of the observed 
variation (X2 = 0.093). We see that partisan alignment exerts a significant effect on outcomes, with 
aligned authorities displaying an enhanced propensity to approve (B=4.276, p<0.001). This finding 
confirms H1, and suggests that local authorities are willing to ‘take one for the team’ by enacting 
decisions that may be unpopular locally but which support the party’s national policy programme.  
To address H2 (which predicted that left-wing constellations would display a reduced 
alignment effect), it is necessary to probe for inter-party variation in this partisan alignment effect. 
In testing the interaction between party control and partisan alignment, I demonstrate that where 
an authority is controlled by Labour and is in alignment with central government, it displays a 
significantly reduced propensity to approve planning applications (B=-11.944, p<0.001). This finding 
confirms H2.
33 Referring back to the insights from Ansell (2014) and Adler and Ansell (2020), it may 
be the case that the Labour central government in fact moved to prioritise protecting its medium-
                                                             
33 The confirmation of H2 and the inference of this Labour alignment effect derives from the strong effect 
present in the model. It should be noted that the number of Labour aligned cases is very low relative to 
conservative aligned cases, and that the possibility of confounders is not fully excluded. 
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term electoral base ahead of its commitments to expanded house-building.34 Beyond these headline 
findings, we also see that proximate local elections, sub-optimal housing market performance, and 
Labour control of a local authority also significantly effect local authority planning outcomes.  
The finding of a significant and positive impact from local elections is surprising (B=1.328, p 
<0.05), given that the intuition was that authorities reduce approval propensity in the run-up to a 
local election so as to minimise electoral costs from giving the go-ahead to unpopular developments. 
One potential explanation of the observed relationship is that councillors may have a strategic 
interest in approving applications that fall in wards controlled by non-aligned colleagues. Councillors 
from the ruling party may therefore ‘dump’ increasing numbers of approvals into non-aligned wards 
to harm the electoral prospects of their competitors. This finding, however, requires further study to 
delve into the interplay between local authority-to-ward level partisan alignment. 
The finding of a significant and positive effect from housing unaffordability (B=1.255, 
p<0.001) suggests that local authorities are responding to the needs of relatively affluent 
populations, boosting approvals in situations in which housing is unaffordable. The housing needs of 
less affluent populations, as evidenced by higher housing waiting lists, does not have a significant 
influence on approval propensity. This finding holds across Labour, Liberal Democrat, and 
Conservative authorities,35 which suggests that local authorities regardless of orientation may pay 
more attention to affluent population concerns. Given that more affluent groups display higher 
propensities to vote, and enjoy greater agenda-setting and lobbying power,36 this finding fits with 
insights from existing literatures. Finally, the finding that Labour control exerts a significant and 
positive effect on approval propensity (B=9.852, p<0.001) confirms in reverse the insight from 
                                                             
34 As a robustness check, I re-ran the model with the inclusion of a dummy variable to test for the impact of 
the National Planning Policy Framework. Under this variable, cases from 2008/09-2011/12 were coded 
negative, and 2012/13-2017/18 positive. Results show that the NPPF exerts a significant and positive effect. In 
this model, no significant changes occur in relation to other variables’ effects on the outcome. 
35 To test the interaction between housing waiting list and party control, I re-ran the model firstly including 
only Labour-controlled authorities, then including only Liberal Democrat authorities, and then only 
Conservative. 
36 For detail on these links between affluence and political power, see Gilens (2012). 
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Goodchild (2010) that right-wing councillors face greater local opposition against proposed 
developments. With their less affluent electoral base being less concerned with protecting local 
property prices against the downward pull from new supply, Labour councillors’ equilibrium 
propensity to approve is significantly elevated.  
 
Conclusion 
The chronic under-supply of new housing in England and attendant pressures on rental costs and 
house prices is generally held to constitute a national crisis.37 Increasingly high rents and house 
prices have conspired to produce ‘Generation Rent’; a cohort that reached adulthood after the 2007 
financial crisis and enjoys a lower capacity to access owner-occupied housing that earlier 
generations. The planning system, which developers must successfully navigate to gain permission 
to build new residential developments, is widely held to be contributing to restricted new housing 
supply and consequent pressures. Given this context, it is imperative that our understanding of the 
political economy of planning outcomes in England be extended. 
Within the English housing system, there is a tension between the interests of central and 
local government. Central government has for many years been pushing for the system to supply 
more housing. Successive Westminster governments have since the 1980s placed increased housing 
supply as a prominent policy goal, and from the mid-2000s have adopted targets for annual new-
build rates of up-to 240,000 units per year at a time when actual supply has often fallen below 
150,000. In contrast, local authorities themselves are often placed under significant pressure from 
residents to block new developments, and local campaigns can be vocal and well-publicised. While 
mechanisms are in place to insulate local authority planning committees from political pressure, 
these processes are often characterised as being shaped by political factors (e.g. Ball et al 2008, Ball 
                                                             
37 For a pan-European review of parallel tensions within national housing systems see Scanlon et al (2014), and 
for a focus on dynamics across middle- and lower-income countries see Clegg (2017). 
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2010). Findings from this paper serve to confirm this characterisation, and reveal new insights into 
the manner in which central-local tensions are managed.    
Through this study, I have demonstrated the existence of a partisan alignment effect within 
the English planning system. By establishing that partisan alignment exerts a significant impact on 
local authority propensity to approve planning applications, I extend scholarship on partisan 
alignment toward a focus on policy outcomes. I also substantively contribute to this scholarship by 
establishing the existence of inter-party variation in the partisan alignment effect. In this case, 
aligned left-wing authorities in fact displayed a reduced approval propensity. This finding fits with 
the expectations of work on the party politics of housing. New developments expand owner-
occupancy, and left-wing national governments stand to lose electoral support with the expansion of 
owner-occupancy. As such, it may be a rational electoral strategy for a Labour national government 
to put pressure on aligned authorities to reduce their propensity to approve planning applications, 
even at the cost to the national policy objective of increased house-building. 
 The findings from this paper suggest that the planning system in England displays 
politicisation not only in terms of the partisan alignment effect, but also through the impact of 
partisan orientation and proximity to elections on observed outcomes. The existence of these 
multiple dimensions of politicisation highlight the need for further study of the determinants of 
planning outcomes, and suggest potentially that action should be taken to ameliorate the impact of 
political factors on local authority decisions.  
Given the entrenched nature of the crisis of undersupply within the English housing system, 
and the consequent pressure on housing costs and emerging inter-generational inequalities, it 
seems undesirable that partisan alignment, partisan orientation, and proximity to elections should 
influence outcomes for large residential planning applications. My findings serve to add force to Ball 
et al’s (2008: 8) criticism of the unpredictability of planning decisions, and my analysis suggests that 
enhanced external scrutiny may be required on local authorities to guard against politicisation. 
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Within the existing oversight structure for the planning process in England, the Planning 
Inspectorate plays an important role in monitoring and reporting on local authority policies and 
outcomes; as such, a more explicit focus within the Inspectorate on political factors may be required. 
Recent findings on the role of party politics in shaping local authority planning outcomes in relation 
to affordable housing, and on the tendency of planning outcomes to favour the interests of more 
affluent populations (Coelho et al 2017, Clegg and Farstad 2019), serve to reinforce my suggestion 
here that enhanced scrutiny of the planning process in England is required.   
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